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Abstract
This paper proposes a model of optimal tax-induced transfer pricing with a fuzzy arm's
length parameter. Fuzzy numbers provide a suitable structure for modelling the ambiguity
that is intrinsic to the arm's length parameter. For the usual conditions regarding the anti-
shifting mechanisms, the optimal transfer price becomes a maximising α-cut of the fuzzy
arm's length parameter. Nonetheless, we show that it is proﬁtable for ﬁrms to choose any
maximising transfer price if the probability of tax audit is suﬃciently low, even if the chosen
price is considered a completely non-arm's length price by tax authorities. In this case, we
derive the necessary and suﬃcient conditions to prevent this extreme shifting strategy.
Keywords: fuzzy proﬁt shifting, transfer pricing, tax evasion, tax enforcement, tax penalty.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F23, H26, K34
1 Introduction
Tax literature frequently draws attention to the ambiguity between a tolerant tax avoidance
behaviour vs. tax evasion. This ambiguity is especially relevant on the analysis of proﬁt shifting
strategies, where multinational enterprises  MNE carry intra-ﬁrm transactions between related
parties from diﬀerent jurisdictions, so to adjust the transfer prices in order to reallocate taxable
proﬁts from high-tax to low-tax locations1. Anti-shifting rules require that the transfer prices
comply with the so called arm's length principle (OECD, 2017), which states that intra-ﬁrm
prices must be consistent with ones that would have been established with independent unrelated
parties. If the arm's length condition is not satisﬁed, tax authorities require the payment of taxes
over the shifted proﬁts, and a tax penalty usually applies.
The arm's length condition is a fuzzy concept, since independent prices are inﬂuenced by
legitimate diﬀerences in transactions' conditions (Becker, Davies, & Jakobs, 2017; Eden, 2001;
∗School of Economics, Business and Accounting at Ribeirão Preto, University of São Paulo, Brazil. E-mail:
alex.rathke@usp.br
1Existing studies provide relevant evidences of proﬁt shifting by means of direct transfer pricing adjustments
(Davies, Martin, Parenti, & Toubal, 2018; Cristea & Nguyen, 2016; Bernard, Jensen, & Schott, 2006; Overesch,
2006; Bartelsman & Beetsma, 2003; Clausing, 2003; Swenson, 2001).
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OECD, 2017). It means that transfer prices are not attained to a unique true arm's length price,
but rather to a range of observable parameter prices with diﬀerent degrees of appropriateness
with respect to the arm's length condition. In the case of a tax audit, the tax authority has
to assess if the transfer prices applied by the MNE satisfy the arm's length condition, or if the
deviations from the core of the arm's length range represent evidences of proﬁt shifting. This is
no more than an ambiguous decision to be taken by the tax authority, thus it implies in additional
uncertainties for the MNE.
This paper derives a model for optimal tax-induced transfer pricing subjected to a fuzzy
arm's length parameter. We apply fuzzy numbers, which were ﬁrst proposed by (Zadeh et al.,
1965) and developed further by several researchers (Zimmermann, 1991; Klir & Yuan, 1995;
Verdegay, 1982), thus to model the impact of the uncertainty that is intrinsic to the arm's
length parameter over the proﬁt-maximisation strategy. Our model follows the concealment
costs approach that is traditional in proﬁt shifting literature (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Kant,
1988; Hines Jr & Rice, 1994), however we design it in a generalised tax condition, which allows
for the maximisation analysis without constraints on the shifting direction. The model takes
the arm's length parameter as a fuzzy number, therefore the maximisation object is also a fuzzy
object.
Baseline analysis shows that the solution of the fuzzy maximisation object under usual con-
ditions is a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length parameter, and any adjustments on the transfer price
up to the optimal level provide a proﬁt-shifting gain for the MNE. Nonetheless, we show that
the MNE may completely disregard the arm's length parameter if the probability of tax audits is
suﬃciently low. It means that it is proﬁtable to choose any maximising transfer price if the MNE
has low chances of being audited, even if the maximising transfer price is considered a completely
non-arm's length price. In this sense, we derive the necessary and suﬃcient conditions to prevent
this extreme shifting case.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic notions
of fuzzy sets and fuzzy numbers. Section 3 derives the general model. Section 4 solves the
fuzzy maximisation object, presents the sensitivity analyses, and derives the impact of a general
tax enforcement eﬀect regarding the country-level anti-shifting variables. Section 5 draws some
concluding comments.
2 Basics on Fuzzy Sets
Fuzzy sets were ﬁrst introduced by seminal paper of (Zadeh et al., 1965) and generalise the
classical notion of crisp sets. Fuzzy sets are a collection of elements in a universe where the
boundary of the set is not clearly deﬁned. The ambiguity associated with the bounds of the fuzzy
set A˜ in a universe X is represented by a membership function deﬁned as µA˜(x) : R → [0, 1],
x ∈ X, for µA˜(x) measures the grade of membership of element x in A˜. If the grade of membership
is 0, then the element x does not belong to A˜. If the grade of membership is 1, then the element
x completely belongs to A˜. If the grade of membership is within the interval [0,1], then the
element x only partially belongs to A˜. The fuzzy set A˜ is therefore characterised by the pair
{(x, µA˜(x)) : x ∈ X}. Two fuzzy sets A˜ and B˜ are considered equal iﬀ µA˜(x) = µB˜(x).
Let A˜ = {(x, µA˜(x)) : x ∈ X} be a fuzzy set and deﬁne a continuous interval α ∈ [0, 1]. The
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ordinary crisp set associated with any α ∈ [0, 1] is called α-cut of the fuzzy set A˜ and is deﬁned
as Aα = {x ∈ X : µA˜(x) ≥ α}. We can use α-cuts to represent intervals on fuzzy sets as
A˜α = [A
∧
α, A
∨
α]
=
[
min
x
{A˜},max
x
{A˜}
]
: A˜ = {(X,µA˜(x)), µA˜(x) ≥ α}.
The sets Aα, α ∈ [0, 1] refer to a decreasing succession of subsets continua; α1 ≥ α2 ⇔ Aα1 ⊆
Aα2 , α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] (Klir & Yuan, 1995).
Theorem. (Representation Theorem - (Klir & Yuan, 1995; Zimmermann, 1991; Verdegay,
1982)2) For a fuzzy set A˜ and its α-cuts Aα, α ∈ [0, 1], we have
A˜ =
⋃
α∈[0,1]
α ·Aα.
If the membership function µAα(x) is deﬁned as the characteristic function of the set Aα
µAα(x) =
{
1, iﬀ x ∈ Aα
0, otherwise
the membership function of the fuzzy set A˜ can be expressed as the characteristic function of its
α-cuts as
µA˜(x) = sup
α∈[0,1]
min (α, µAα(x)).
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A fuzzy set A˜ is convex iﬀ its α-cuts are convex. Equivalently, A˜ is convex iﬀ ∀x1, x2 ∈
X, λ ∈ [0, 1] : µA˜(λx1 + (1 − λ)x2) ≥ min (µA˜(x1), µA˜(x2)). A fuzzy set A˜ is normalised iﬀ
supx∈X µA˜ = 1.
A fuzzy number is a special case of a fuzzy set on the real line that is both convex and
normalized. Its membership function is piecewise continuous and ∃x0 ∈ R : µA˜(x0) = 1 is called
its mode. Since fuzzy sets are completely deﬁned by their corresponding membership functions,
we refer to a fuzzy number as the set A˜ as well as the membership function µA˜(x) hereinafter.
For a sequence of real numbers x∧ ≤ x¯∧ ≤ x¯∨ ≤ x∨ ∈ R, the fuzzy number A˜ satisﬁes the
following:
a. µA˜(x) = 0 for each x /∈ [x∧, x∨] ;
b. µA˜(x) is non-decreasing in [x
∧, x¯∧] and non-increasing in [x¯∨, x∨] ;
c. µA˜(x) = 1 for each x ∈ [x¯∧, x¯∨] ;
where [x¯∧, x¯∨] is the mode of the fuzzy number, [x∧, x¯∧] is the interval on the lower side of the
mode with width x¯∧ − x∧, and [x¯∨, x∨] is the interval on the upper side of the mode with width
2(Klir & Yuan, 1995) analyse this theorem in a set of three Decomposition Theorems for representation of
fuzzy sets by means of their α-cuts.
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x∨− x¯∨. A fuzzy number A˜ is of the LR-type if it can be parametrised by shape functions f∧(·)
and f∨(·) on the lower and upper sides of the mode respectively3. A plane fuzzy number satisﬁes
∃(x¯∧, x¯∨) ∈ R, x¯∧ < x¯∨ : ∀x ∈ [x¯∧, x¯∨]→ µA˜(x) = 1, i.e. its mode is a non-empty interval with
more than one element (Klir & Yuan, 1995; Zimmermann, 1991). A fuzzy number is called a
trapezoidal fuzzy number iﬀ it takes the form
µA˜(x) =

x− x∧
x¯∧ − x∧ , x
∧ ≤ x ≤ x¯∧
1, x¯∧ ≤ x ≤ x¯∨
x∨ − x
x∨ − x¯∨ , x¯
∨ ≤ x ≤ x∨
0, otherwise.
A fuzzy number is called a triangular fuzzy number iﬀ it takes the form
µB˜(x) =

x− x∧
x¯∧ − x∧ , x
∧ ≤ x ≤ x¯∧
x∨ − x
x∨ − x¯∧ , x¯
∧ ≤ x ≤ x∨
0, otherwise.
Figure 1: Examples of fuzzy numbers: A symmetric trapezoidal fuzzy number A˜ on the left and
a symmetric triangular fuzzy number B˜ on the right. Both A˜ and B˜ are special fuzzy numbers
of the LR-type.
Figure 1 shows examples of trapezoidal and triangular fuzzy numbers. It is clear that a
trapezoidal fuzzy number is an instance of plane fuzzy number, and a triangular fuzzy number
refers to a trapezoidal fuzzy number with x¯∧ = x¯∨.
3Literature commonly refer to the left and right sides of the mode µA˜(x) = 1, i.e. though the origin of the
term LR-type with shape functions L(·) and R(·).
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3 The Model
In this section, we derive a model to analyse the optimal tax-induced transfer pricing. We ﬁrst
set the baseline net proﬁt function for the MNE, then we derive the speciﬁcation of the fuzzy
proﬁt shifting optimisation.
3.1 Baseline Proﬁt Design
Consider a vertically integrated MNE with two divisions, the parent company located in Country
1 and a wholly owned subsidiary located in Country 2, i = {1, 2}. Both divisions4 produce
outputs xi under costs Ci(xi), bringing revenues Ri(si) based on domestic sales si(xi). Parent
ﬁrm also exports a portion m of its output to subsidiary in Country 2, regarding a single type of
product, charging a transfer price p established by means of exclusive self-discretion of MNE's
central management. We set m = m(s2) and ∂m/∂s2 > 0, thus intra-ﬁrm output m depends on
the market demand for ﬁnal product in Country 2. The pre-tax proﬁts of both divisions are
pi1 = R1(s1)− C1(s1 +m) + pm;
pi2 = R2(s2)− C2(s2 −m)− pm.
Country 1 applies the source principle on taxation of foreign proﬁts, and we assume no in-
cremental operational cost on transferring internal output m to division 2, i.e. ∂Ci(m,xi)/∂m =
∂Ci(m,xi)/∂xi. For an income tax rate τi ∈ [0, 1] in each country, MNE's global net proﬁts are
Π(τi, si, p,m) = (1− τ1)pi1 + (1− τ2)pi2. Proﬁt shifting incentives arise when tax rates between
divisions are diﬀerent, τ1 6= τ2, and total net proﬁt Π(·) increases when MNE is able to choose
a speciﬁc transfer price p so proﬁts are transferred from the high-tax country to the low-tax
country. The condition ∂Π(·)/∂p = (τ2 − τ1)m implies the following two cases:
Low Transfer Price case - LTP: τ2 < τ1 → ∂Π(·)
∂p
< 0;
High Transfer Price case - HTP: τ2 > τ1 → ∂Π(·)
∂p
> 0.
(1)
In the LTP case, the MNE has incentives to shift proﬁts from division 1 to division 2 by
choosing a low transfer price p, thus harming tax revenues in Country 1. In the HTP case, MNE
chooses a high price p so to shift proﬁts to the opposite direction, thus harming Country 2.
3.2 Fuzzifying the Arm's Lenght Price
Assume that both countries impose a non-negligible and non-deductible tax penalty zi > 0 if
proﬁt shifting is detected, which is computed as a portion of the amount of evaded taxes. It
means that the tax penalty zi is imposed if the harmed Country i observes that the transfer
4For simpliﬁcation, we apply subscript i for the reference of both countries and to each MNE's divisions
hereinafter.
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price p is diﬀerent from a parameter price p¯ established under arm's length conditions5 and this
price gap results in the outﬂow of taxable proﬁts from Country i. The parameter of an arm's
length price is a fuzzy concept, since independent prices vary according to legitimate diﬀerences
in transactions' conditions. Therefore, countries rather observe a fuzzy set of parameter prices P˜ ,
all of which have diﬀerent degrees of appropriateness with respect to the arm's length principle6.
Deﬁne the fuzzy set of arm's length prices P˜ = {(pj , µP˜ (pj)) : pj ∈ P}, j 6= i, P ∈ R+, where
P is the universe of all observable independent prices, universe P is convex, and µP˜ (pj) is the
membership function of the fuzzy set P˜ . For a sequence of independent prices p∧ ≤ p¯∧ ≤ p¯∨ ≤
p∨ ∈ P , the fuzzy set P˜ satisﬁes the usual conditions
µP˜ (pj) = 0 for ∀pj /∈ [p∧, p∨]; (2)
µP˜ (pj) is non-decreasing for ∀pj ∈ [p∧, p¯∧]; (3)
µP˜ (pj) is non-increasing for ∀pj ∈ [p¯∨, p∨]. (4)
The mode of the fuzzy set P˜ satisﬁes ∀pj ∈ P : µP˜ (pj) = 1, which provides the interval of
prices that completely satisfy the arm's length principle, µP˜ (pj) = 1 for ∀pj ∈ [p¯∧, p¯∨]. Hence,
the choice of any strict parameter price p¯ must lie within the interval of prices that deﬁne the
mode of the fuzzy set P˜ , i.e. p¯ ∈ [p¯∧, p¯∨]. Eq. 2 deﬁnes the limiting interval [p∧, p∨] out of which
any price p is considered a completely non-arm's length price.
Under these conditions, the fuzzy set P˜ becomes a fuzzy number of the LR-type. Call P˜ the
fuzzy arm's length price. We deﬁne a standard membership function of the fuzzy number P˜ as
follows:
µP˜ (pj) =

f∧
(
pj − p∧
p¯∧ − p∧
)
, p∧ ≤ pj ≤ p¯∧
1, p¯∧ ≤ pj ≤ p¯∨
f∨
(
pj − p∨
p¯∨ − p∨
)
, p¯∨ ≤ pj ≤ p∨
0, otherwise
(5)
with both functions f∧(·) and f∧(·) monotone continuous. In Eq. 5, we allow for the fuzzy
arm's length price P˜ to be asymmetric. This asymmetry may be due to a diﬀerence in the
widths p¯∧− p∧ and p∨− p¯∨ on the lower and upper sides of the fuzzy number P˜ respectively, as
well as for diﬀerences in grades of membership denoted by functions f∧(·) and f∨(·). In eﬀect,
the asymmetry in the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ is useful to describe how Countries 1 and 2
diﬀer in their tolerance for a transfer price p farther from the parameter price p¯.
5The transfer pricing guidelines prepared by (OECD, 2017) have become the main criterion adopted by most
countries worldwide for evaluation of intra-ﬁrm prices. The guidelines are built on the basis of the arm's length
principle as the fundamentals for tax-compliant transfer pricing.
6In this line, anti-shifting rules usually establish an arm's length range of appropriate transfer prices. The
arm's length range is usually set as an interquartile range within the complete set of comparable prices (OECD,
2017).
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For the LTP case in Eq. 1, Country 1 is less tolerant with respect to a low transfer price close
to p∧, while it accepts prices near or higher than the parameter price p¯. Therefore, Country 1 is
only concerned with the lower side f∧(·) of the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ . The opposite occurs
for the HTP case in Eq. 1, since Country 2 is only concerned with the higher side f∨(·) of P˜ . If
we divide the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ into two membership sections with respect to lower side
f∧(·) and upper side f∨(·), we obtain two fuzzy numbers P˜∧ and P˜∨ satisfying the additional
conditions:
µP˜∧(pj) =
{
µP˜ (pj), pj ≤ p¯∨
1, pj > p¯
∨.
(6)
µP˜∨(pj) =
{
µP˜ (pj), pj ≥ p¯∧
1, pj < p¯
∧.
(7)
P˜ = P˜∧ ∩ P˜∨. (8)
It is clear that the fuzzy numbers P˜∧ and P˜∨ refer to the fuzzy arm's length prices taken into
account by Countries 1 and 2 respectively7. We indicate the standard form of the fuzzy arm's
length prices satisfying conditions in Eq. 6-8 as P˜ c, c = {∧,∨}. The mode of the fuzzy numbers
P˜ c satisﬁes the standard condition ∀pj ∈ P : µP˜ c(pj) = 1. The bound of the mode of the fuzzy
numbers P˜ c is deﬁned in standard form8 as p¯c. Hence, both proﬁt shifting cases in Eq. 1 imply
LTP → {i = 1, c = ∧}, HTP → {i = 2, c = ∨}.
3.3 Tax Audits and Tax Penalties
Both countries perform tax audits in order to prevent the proﬁt shifting. In the universe of all
taxpayers, we assume that countries are not able to continuously observe all MNE in absolute
completeness, but they have to ex ante select which MNE are going to be audited. In special,
both countries have no prior knowledge about the existence of intra-ﬁrm transactions pm, though
this knowledge depends on an initial pick. Following (Levaggi & Menoncin, 2013), we set the
audit selection in Country i as a Poisson process with intensity rate λi > 0 homogeneous through
the total period determined in the legal statute of limitations. Rate λi refers to the tax audit
intensity in Country i. If the MNE is selected, Country i will observe pm, thus triggering a
chance for tax penalty zi.
If the number of tax audits performed by Country i is q ∈ N, the probability of exact q = k
tax audits is P(q = k, λi) = λki e−λi/k!. Furthermore, the cumulative probability of Country i to
perform up to k audits, P(0 ≤ q ≤ k, λi) is computed as
P(0 ≤ q ≤ k, λi) =
k∑
q=0
P(q, λi) =
Γ(k + 1, λi)
Γ(k + 1)
(9)
7It is also clear that the fuzzy numbers P˜∧ and P˜∨ are of the L-type and R-type respectively.
8The bound p¯c of the mode of the fuzzy number P˜ c can be deﬁned as
p¯c : µP˜c(p¯
c + ∆p) < 1, lim
∆p→0
µP˜c(p¯
c + ∆p) = 1
with deviation ∆p ∈ R.
7
where Γ(k) is the gamma function and Γ(k, λ) is the upper gamma function9. Remark that no
penalisation will be imposed if there is no tax audit, q = 0. Moreover, even with an estimate
of the number of tax audits E(q = k, λi) = λi, the MNE can be selected under any number q
diﬀerent from k. In summary, MNE has a chance of being selected for tax audit if Country i
performs at least one audit. Therefore, the total probability of tax audit for the MNE is
P(q > 0, λi) = 1− P(q = 0, λi) = 1− Γ(1, λi)
Γ(1)
= 1− e−λi . (10)
In the case of audit selection, Country i observes the intra-ﬁrm transactions pm and compares
the transfer price p with the arm's length parameter p¯. If the harmed Country i concludes
that the MNE is shifting taxable proﬁts away, the MNE is required to pay the amount of
evaded taxes plus a penalty zi levied over this amount. In this case, tax penalty is computed
as Zi(zi, τi, p, p¯,m) = (1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi · (p − p¯)m ≥ 0, where sgn(·) is the sign function
and tax rates are non-negative, τi ∈ [0, 1] . Observe that the total tax penalty is non-negative
Zi(·) ≥ 0 for both LTP and HTP cases10.
Nonetheless, the assessment of the transfer price p by Country i is based on the fuzzy arm's
length parameter P˜ c, c = {∧,∨}. Formally, this assessment is made by taking the fuzzy number
P˜ c = {(pj , µP˜ c(pj)) : pj ∈ P} and setting the equality p = pj . The result is a fuzzy price gap
∆p = p˜− p¯c, where p¯c is the bound of the mode of the fuzzy number P˜ c. The fuzzy price gap
∆p is deﬁned such as to satisfy the condition p = {(p¯c + ∆p, µP˜ c(p¯c + ∆p)) : p ∈ P}. For the
harmed Country i, proﬁt shifting may exist iﬀ µP˜ c(p) < 1, i.e. iﬀ the fuzzy price gap ∆p pushes
the transfer price p away from the mode of P˜ c, ∀pj : µP˜ c(pj) = 1. In this case, the original tax
penalty Zi(·) ≥ 0 turns into a fuzzy tax penalty in the following standard form:
Z˜i(zi, τi,∆p,m) =
{
0, µP˜ c(p) = 1
(1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi · (p˜− p¯c)m, otherwise.
(11)
It means that the harmed Country i has the task to assess if the price gap ∆p is a tolerable
variance under the fuzzy arm's length conditions or if it is an evidence of proﬁt shifting.
4 Optimal Transfer Pricing
The MNE aims choose a transfer price p so to maximise global net proﬁts Π(·), however it faces
the chance of tax penalisation if the harmed Country i ﬁnds out the existence of intra-ﬁrm
transactions pm and decides that it represents a proﬁt shifting strategy. In this line, assuming
that the optimal transfer price p∗ implies µP˜ c(p
∗) < 1, the MNE has a maximisation object
speciﬁed as follows:
9Derivation of Eq. 9 in Appendix.
10Total tax penalty Zi(·) ≥ 0 is non-negative since the signs of both the tax diﬀerential τ2 − τ1 and the price
gap p− p¯ carry information about the shifting direction; HTP implies τ2 − τ1 > 0, p− p¯ > 0, while LTP implies
τ2 − τ1 < 0, p− p¯ < 0.
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max
p∈P
E(Π˜(·)) = Π(τi, si, p,m)− E(Z˜i(zi, τi,∆p,m))
= (1− τ1)pi1 + (1− τ2)pi2
−(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi · (p˜− p¯c)m.
(12)
Since the expected tax penalty E(Z˜i(·)) is a fuzzy number, objective function in Eq. 12
becomes a fuzzy objective, and proﬁt maximisation must take into account the fuzziness of the
price gap ∆p = p˜− p¯c.
Conditions in Eq. 6-8 show that the standard-form fuzzy arm's length price P˜ c represents a
one-to-one and onto correspondence µP˜ c(pj) : R → [0, 1] with respect to the closed interval of
interest pj ∈ [pc, p¯c]. Therefore, we solve Eq. 12 by applying the procedure for fuzzy optimisation
developed in the classical work of (Verdegay, 1982).
For the membership function µP˜ c(pj), pj ∈ [pc, p¯c], the corresponding α-cuts are P cα = {pj ∈
[pc, p¯c] : µP˜ c(pj) ≥ α}. From the representation theorem for fuzzy sets, Eq. 12 is expressed in
the following parametric form:
max
α∈[0,1]
p∈P cα
E(Π˜(·)) = (1− τ1)pi1 + (1− τ2)pi2
−(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi · (p− p¯c)f(α)m
(13)
with α ∈ [0, 1], where f(α) : [0, 1] → P ∈ R+, f(α) = µ−1P˜ c (α) is the inverse function of the
membership function µP˜ c(pj). Simply stated, if the solution of Eq. 13 is p
∗(α), then the solution
of Eq. 12 is the fuzzy set p∗ = {(p(α), α)}. Hence, proﬁt maximisation in Eq. 12 resumes to
ﬁnd the optimal α-cut deﬁned by P c=α = {p∗(α) ∈ [pc, p¯c] : µP˜ c(p∗(α)) = α} at the membership
grade µP˜ c(p
∗(α)) = α.
Based on the general Stone-Weierstrass approximation, assume that the standard-form shape
function f c(·) in Eq. 5 can be deﬁned as a simple power function
f c
(
p− pc
p¯c − pc
)
=
(
p− pc
p¯c − pc
)γi
(14)
with γi ∈ (0, 1] as a regularised parameter for the tolerance of Country i regarding fuzziness
in the arm's length price, e.g. a slacken tax assessment by Country i implies γi → 0, while
a tighten tax assessment implies γi → 1. Eq. 14 provides a smooth variation in membership
grade as transfer price p gets farther from the bound of the mode p¯c. For the interval of interest
p ∈ [pc, p¯c], parametric optimisation in Eq. 13 then becomes
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max
p∈[pc,p¯c]
E(Π˜(·)) = (1− τ1)pi1 + (1− τ2)pi2
−(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi · (p− p¯c) · µ−1P˜ c (α)m
= (1− τ1)pi1 + (1− τ2)pi2
−(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi · (p− p¯c)
(
1−
(
p− pc
p¯c − pc
)) 1
γi
m
= (1− τ1)pi1 + (1− τ2)pi2
−(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi · (p− p¯c)
(
p− p¯c
pc − p¯c
) 1
γi
m.
(15)
Now we have the expected net proﬁts E(Π˜(·)) speciﬁed completely in terms of the transfer
price11 p. Diﬀerentiating Eq. 15 with respect to p and solving, we obtain the solution
∂E(Π˜(·))
∂p
= (τ2 − τ1)m− (1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi ·
(
1 +
1
γi
)(
p− p¯c
pc − p¯c
) 1
γi
m = 0;
p∗ = p¯c +
 τ2 − τ1
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
γi (pc − p¯c)
= p¯c +
 |τ2 − τ1|
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
γi (pc − p¯c)
= P c=α = {p∗ ∈ [pc, p¯c] : µP˜ c(p∗) = α}
(16)
with | · | : R → R+ as the absolute value function12. Eq. 16 shows that the optimal transfer
price p∗ is represented as a maximising α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ c deﬁned as
P c=α = {p∗ ∈ [pc, p¯c] : µP˜ c(p∗) = α}, i.e. the optimal price gap ∆p∗ = p∗ − p¯c is a share of the
price diﬀerence pc − p¯c. This α-cut is represented by a share function over the interval [pc, p¯c],
which is measured as the magnitude of the proﬁt shifting incentive |τ2 − τ1| adjusted by the
marginal expected penalisation eﬀect (1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · τi. The slope of this share is the same
as of the shape function in Eq. 14 by means of the exponent γi. It also has an adjustment
equal to (γi + 1)/γi, which derives from the endogenous speciﬁcation of the fuzzy arm's length
price P˜ c in terms of p within the expected tax penalty in Eq. 1513. Moreover, the amount of
intra-ﬁrm output m does not aﬀect the optimal transfer price p∗ in the model, i.e. it refers
11Parametric form in Eq. 15 is possible since the arm's length parameters pc, p¯c ∈ P are exogenous with respect
to Π(·) and Z˜(·).
12The following property is applied: for any real number ∀x ∈ R, x satisﬁes
x = sgn(x) · |x| → |x| = x
sgn(x)
.
13More speciﬁcally, the transfer price p aﬀects both the transfer price gap ∆p = p − p¯c and the membership
relation µP˜c(p) speciﬁed by the shape function in Eq. 14, for the combined marginal eﬀect on Z˜(·) becomes
(γi + 1)/γi. On the other hand, the transfer price p aﬀects marginally the net proﬁts Π(·) in a direct way. The
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to the application of the pure comparable uncontrolled price  CUP method14 (OECD, 2017).
Suﬃcient joint conditions for non-zero optimal ∆p∗ are τ1 6= τ2, zi <∞ and pc 6= p¯c.
Recall that the two proﬁt shifting cases in Eq. 1 imply LTP → {i = 1, c = ∧}, HTP
→ {i = 2, c = ∨}. Total gains from proﬁt shifting are obtained by substituting the optimal
transfer price p∗ on the expected net proﬁts E(Π˜(p∗)) and comparing it with the net proﬁts
under the arm's length condition E(Π˜(p¯c)). We ﬁnd
E(Π˜(p∗))− E(Π˜(p¯c)) = (τ2 − τ1) ·∆p∗m · 1
1 + γi
> 0 (17)
which is always positive for both LTP and HTP cases.
Proposition 1. Satisfying suﬃcient joint conditions for non-zero price gap, τ1 6= τ2, zi < ∞
and pc 6= p¯c, tax-induced variations in transfer prices always increase the expected net proﬁts up
to the optimal price gap
∆p∗ =
 |τ2 − τ1|
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
γi (pc − p¯c).
Proof. Expected net proﬁts with respect to the optimal transfer price p∗ and to the bound of
the mode of the arm's length condition p¯c are equal to
E(Π˜(p∗)) = (1− τ1)[R1(s1)− C1(s1 +m)] + (1− τ2)[R2(s2)− C2(s2 −m)]
+(τ2 − τ1)
p¯c +
 |τ2 − τ1|
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
γi (pc − p¯c)
m
−
(
τ2 − τ1
1 + 1γi
) |τ2 − τ1|
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
γi (pc − p¯c)m;
E(Π˜(p¯c)) = (1− τ1)[R1(s1)− C1(s1 +m)] + (1− τ2)[R2(s2)− C2(s2 −m)] + (τ2 − τ1)p¯cm.
total eﬀect on the expected net proﬁts is equal to
1− 1γ1+1
γ1
=
1
1 + γi
.
14Literature indicates that proﬁt shifting detection is more eﬀective if tax audits focus on the amount of intra-
ﬁrm transfers pm rather than on transfer prices only (Nielsen, Schindler, & Schjelderup, 2014). Nonetheless,
anti-shifting rules require the application of the arm's length principle solely for the establishment of transfer
prices p, i.e. there are no current requirements for an "arm's length quantity"  say "m¯", and tax authorities
bear no arguments against any intra-ﬁrm output m as long as the transfer price is equal to the arm's length price,
p = p¯. Eq. 16 reﬂects this condition.
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The diﬀerence E(Π˜(p∗))− E(Π˜(p¯c)) is equal to
E(Π˜(p∗))− E(Π˜(p¯c)) =
= (τ2 − τ1)
(
1
1 + γi
) |τ2 − τ1|
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
γi (pc − p¯c)m
= (τ2 − τ1) ·∆p∗m · 1
1 + γi
> 0
which is positive for both LTP and HTP cases derived in Eq. 1 as we have
LTP : {i = 1, c = ∧} → {τ2 − τ1 < 0,∆p∗ < 0};
HTP : {i = 2, c = ∨} → {τ2 − τ1 > 0,∆p∗ > 0}.
We state a relevant condition for the audit intensity λi > 0 derived from Eq. 16:
Proposition 2. The optimal transfer price p∗ is a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ c only
if the audit intensity λi satisﬁes the condition
λi ≥ − ln
1− |τ2 − τ1|
(1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
 .
Proof. For the optimal transfer price p∗ to be an optimal α-cut equal to P c=α = {p∗ ∈ P :
µP˜ c(p
∗) = α}, speciﬁcation in Eq. 16 requires the condition |τ2 − τ1|
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
γi ∈ [0, 1].
which implies |∆p∗| ≤ |pc − p¯c|. With respect to the domain of all variables within Eq. 16, we
observe that the only case where the condition |∆p∗| ≤ |pc − p¯c| is violated is when the audit
intensity λi is suﬃciently small, such that
{∀δ > 0, λi > 0 : λi < δ0} →
 |τ2 − τ1|
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
γi > 1
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for some value δ0. The necessary condition |∆p∗| ≤ |pc − p¯c| implies
1 ≥
 |τ2 − τ1|
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
γi
(1− e−λi)γi ≥
 |τ2 − τ1|
(1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
γi
e−λi ≤ 1− |τ2 − τ1|
(1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
λi ≥ − ln
1− |τ2 − τ1|
(1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
 .
If this condition is not satisﬁed, the optimal transfer price p∗ as speciﬁed in Eq. 16 outbounds
the interval of interest, p∗ /∈ [pc, p¯c], thus the solution of Eq. 16 is no more a α-cut of the fuzzy
arm's length price P˜ c.
Proposition 2 shows that the optimal transfer price as speciﬁed in Eq. 16 outbounds the
interval of interest, p∗ /∈ [pc, p¯c] if the audit intensity is suﬃciently weak. In this special case, the
MNE can further increase the gains from proﬁt shifting by disregarding the bounds of the fuzzy
arm's length price P˜ c when determining the transfer price p. It therefore implies:
Corollary 1. If the audit intensity λi > 0 does not satisfy the condition in Proposition 2,
maximisation object in Eq. 12 has no general solution in terms of an optimal transfer price p∗.
Proof. Assume that the solution of Eq. 16 provides the inequality |∆p∗| > |pc − p¯c|, so the
condition in Proposition 2 is violated. Therefore, Eq. 5-8 imply that the optimal transfer price
p∗ has a membership grade equal to zero, µP˜ c(p
∗) = 0, so p∗ is considered a completely non-arm's
length price. In this case, it is clear that the initial maximisation object in Eq. 12 takes the
form of a crisp linear function of p in the ﬁrst place, with no constraints, which is equal to
max
p∈P
E(Π(·)) = (1− τ1)pi1 + (1− τ2)pi2
−(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi · (p− p¯c)m
with ﬁrst derivative equal to
∂E(Π(·))
∂p
= (τ2 − τ1)m− (1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi ·m = 0
and second derivative equal to zero. The critical point at ∂E(Π(·))/∂p = 0 provides the same
conditions as in Eq. 1, for we have
LTP : {i = 1, τ1 > τ2} → (τ2 − τ1) = (1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi < 0;
HTP : {i = 2, τ1 < τ2} → (τ2 − τ1) = (1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · sgn(τ2 − τ1)τi > 0.
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Therefore, any changes in the transfer price p towards the proﬁt shifting direction increases the
expected net proﬁts with no upper bound, for both LTP ans HTP cases.
Corollary 1 simply shows that the MNE has full incentives to shift proﬁts away from the
high tax Country i if the tax authority is lax. For a suﬃciently weak audit intensity λi, the
expected tax penalty becomes extremely low and linear with respect to the transfer price p 
see Proposition 2. In this case, it becomes proﬁtable for the MNE to choose any tax-induced
transfer price p, even if p is considered a completely non-arm's length price.
4.1 Sensitivity Analyses
Initially state the following:
Corollary 2. Under the optimality conditions regarding the price gap ∆p∗, increase in intra-ﬁrm
outputs m always increases the total amount of proﬁt shifting.
Proof. Derives directly from the gains of proﬁt shifting in Eq. 17
∂[E(Π˜(p∗))− E(Π˜(p¯c))]
∂m
= (τ2 − τ1) ·∆p∗ · 1
1 + γi
> 0.
Marginal changes in intra-ﬁrm output m intensify the proﬁt shifting amount, however intra-
ﬁrm transfers depends on the product demand in Country 2, s2. Assume that the demand in
division 2 is not changed, but the MNE has ﬂexibility to vary the application of internal output
m to provide revenues in division 2. Hence, the MNE can run a second optimisation stage to
choose the optimal intra-ﬁrm outputm. Diﬀerentiating the second-stage objective E(Π˜(p∗)) with
respect to intra-ﬁrm output m, subjected to the constraint m ≤ s2, we obtain
∂E(Π˜(p∗,m))
∂m
= −(1− τ1)∂C1(m)
∂m
+ (1− τ2)∂C2(m)
∂m
+ (τ2 − τ1)
(
p¯c + ∆p∗
1
1 + γi
)
−L(s2 −m) = 0;
(1− τ1)∂C1(m)
∂m
= (1− τ2)∂C2(m)
∂m
+ (τ2 − τ1)
(
p¯c + ∆p∗
1
1 + γi
)
− L(s2 −m)
(18)
with conditions−∂C1(m)/∂m < 0, ∂C2(m)/∂m > 0, L(s2−m) = 0, where L(·) is the Lagrangian
multiplier function. If the constraint is not binding, m < s2, we have L(·) = 0. In Eq. 18,
the exogenous eﬀect of the intra-ﬁrm transaction (τ2 − τ1)p¯c follows the direction of the proﬁt
shifting incentive  LTP implies (τ2− τ1)p¯∧ < 0 and HTP implies (τ2− τ1)p¯∨ > 0, p¯c ∈ P ∈ R+,
c = {∧,∨}. However, the eﬀect of the optimal price gap is always positive, (τ2− τ1)∆p∗ · [1/(1 +
γi)] > 0, γi ∈ (0, 1]  see the Corollary 2 . Equality of net marginal costs occurs only in the
extreme LTP case where the eﬀect of the optimal price gap completely neutralises the exogenous
arm's length eﬀect, i.e. iﬀ p¯c = ∆p∗ · [1/(1 + γi)]. Hence, at the optimal intra-ﬁrm output m∗,
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the generalised condition (1− τ1) · [∂C1(m)/∂m] 6= (1− τ2) · [∂C2(m)/∂m] is attained in most of
cases.
In special, Eq. 18 indicates that diﬀerent tax rates disturb the eﬀect of the m-elasticity
of substitution between costs C1(m) and C2(m) over the expected net proﬁts E(Π˜(p,m)). The
eﬀect is equal to 1−τ11−τ2 ·εC1,C2 , τi ∈ [0, 1], where εC1,C2 is them-elasticity of substitution15 between
C1(m) and C2(m).
With respect to the proﬁt shifting incentive τ2 − τ1, τ1 6= τ2, it is clear that the optimal
transfer price p∗ is aﬀected by changes in tax rate τi ∈ [0, 1]. Diﬀerentiating Eq. 16 with respect
to τi, we obtain the following standard-form equations
16:
∂p∗
∂τi
=
γi(p
c − p¯c)(
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) ·
(
1 + 1γi
))γi · τi − |τ2 − τ1|
τ1+γii · |τ2 − τ1|1−γi
; (19)
∂2p∗
∂τ2i
=
∂p∗
∂τi
· (γi − 1) · τi − (γi + 1) · |τ2 − τ1|
τi · |τ2 − τ1| . (20)
First, Eq. 19 shows that the variation ∂p∗/∂τi follows the proﬁt shifting direction.
Proposition 3. Variation in the optimal transfer price p∗ with respect to marginal changes in
the tax rate τi of the harmed Country i follows the direction of the proﬁt shifting incentive τ2−τ1,
such that sgn(∂p∗/∂τi) = sgn(∆p∗). Variation ∂p∗/∂τi is equal zero iﬀ τj 6=i = 0.
Proof. From Eq. 19, the diﬀerence τi − |τ2 − τ1| > 0, τi ∈ [0, 1], τj 6=i 6= 0, i, j = {1, 2} is always
positive. In this case, the following conditions are satisﬁed for each LTP and HTP cases:
LTP : {i = 1, c = ∧} → {∆p∗ < 0, pc − p¯c < 0→ ∂p∗/∂τi < 0};
HTP : {i = 2, c = ∨} → {∆p∗ > 0, pc − p¯c > 0→ ∂p∗/∂τi > 0}.
For the limiting case where τj 6=i = 0, Eq. 16 is no more a function of τi, so we clearly have
τj 6=i = 0→ ∂p∗/∂τi = 0.
As it is intuitively conjectured, Proposition 3 shows that marginal increments in the tax rate
τi of the harmed Country i widens the optimal price gap ∆p
∗ thus to shift more proﬁts away from
Country i, since it represents an increase in the proﬁt shifting incentive. Reductions in tax rate
τi cause the reverse eﬀect. On the other hand, for marginal changes in tax rate τj 6=i, i, j = {1, 2}
of the non-harmed Country j, variation ∂p∗/∂τj takes the opposite direction, e.g. a marginal
increase in τj 6=i shrinks the optimal price gap ∆p∗ and reduces the gains from proﬁt shifting17.
15Formally, the eﬀect of the m-elasticity is equal to
1− τ1
1− τ2 · εC1,C2 −
(
τ2 − τ1
1− τ2
)(
p¯cm
C1(m)
)
· εp¯c,C2 −
(
τ2 − τ1
1− τ2
)(
1
1 + γi
)(
∆p∗m
C1(m)
)
· ε∆p∗,C2
where εp¯c,C2 is the m-elasticity between the arm's length parameter p¯
c and C2(m), and ε∆p∗,C2 is the m-
elasticity between ∆p∗ and C2(m). Eq. 16 implies both ∂p¯c/∂m = 0 → ∂p¯c/∂C2(m) = 0, ∂∆p∗/∂m = 0 →
∂∆p∗/∂C2(m) = 0, therefore we have εp¯c,C2 = 0, ε∆p∗,C2 = 0.
16Derivation of Eq. 19-20 in Appendix.
17For changes in τj 6=i, i, j = {1, 2}, we have the condition
sgn
(
∂p∗
∂τi
)
= −sgn
(
∂p∗
∂τj
)
→ sgn
(
∂p∗
∂τj
)
= −sgn(∆p∗).
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For the limiting case where the tax rate of the non-harmed Country j is zero, τj 6=i = 0, changes
in the tax rate τi do not aﬀect the optimal price gap ∆p
∗. The general condition for Eq. 19 to
be linear occurs at the arm's length tolerance parameter equal to
γi(τi, |τ2 − τ1|) = W [(τi · |τ2 − τ1|) · (ln(|τ2 − τ1|)− ln(τi))]
ln(|τ2 − τ1|)− ln(τi) ∈ (0, 1]
with τj 6=i 6= 0, where W (τi, |τ2 − τ1|) is the Lambert product log function18.
Furthermore, Eq. 20 describes the slope of changes in the optimal transfer price p∗ as the tax
rate τi changes. Under the scope of both LTP and HTP cases, Eq. 20 shows that the slope of
the variation ∂p∗/∂τi is opposite to the proﬁt shifting direction; the slope of ∂p∗/∂τi is strictly
increasing for the LTP case and strictly decreasing for the HTP case.
Proposition 4. The slope of the variation ∂p∗/∂τi is opposite to the proﬁt shifting direction,
such that sgn(∂2p∗/∂τ2i ) = −sgn(∂p∗/∂τi).
Proof. First, the multiplier at the right hand side of Eq. 20 equal to
ε2p∗,τi
τi
=
(γi − 1) · τi − (γi + 1) · |τ2 − τ1|
τi · |τ2 − τ1|
is deﬁned as the second-order τi-semi-elasticity of the optimal transfer price p
∗, thus Eq. 20 is
equal to Eq. 19 multiplied by ε2p∗,τi/τi. We notice that ε
2
p∗,τi/τi < 0, τi ∈ [0, 1], γi ∈ (0, 1] is always
negative for both LTP and HTP cases. Proposition 3 shows that sgn(∂p∗/∂τi) = sgn(∆p∗),
therefore it implies
sgn
(
∂2p∗
∂τ2i
)
= −sgn
(
∂p∗
∂τi
)
= −sgn(∆p∗).
If τi → τj , i, j = {1, 2}, the tax diﬀerential tends to zero, τ2− τ1 → 0, so Eq. 20 diverges for any
γi < 1 as follows:
γi < 1→ lim
τi→τj
γi(p
c − p¯c)(
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) ·
(
1 + 1γi
))γi · (γi − 1)
τγii · |τ2 − τ1|→0+
2−γi = −sgn(τ2 − τ1) · ∞
where sgn(τ2 − τ1) = sgn(pc − p¯c), which implies
sgn
(
∂2p∗
∂τ2i
)
= −sgn(τ2 − τ1) = −sgn
(
∂p∗
∂τi
)
= −sgn(∆p∗).
The slope of ∂p∗/∂τi is equal to zero only in the special case where γi = 1, τi = τj , i.e. it does not
ﬁt either LTP or HTP cases. Therefore, both LTP and HTP cases strictly satisfy the condition
sgn(∂2p∗/∂τ2i ) = −sgn(∂p∗/∂τi).
Eq. 20 shows that the variation ∂p∗/∂τi is elastic if the tax diﬀerential τ2−τ1 is narrow, since
it implies that the initial shifting incentive is weak and the maximising price gap ∆p∗ is rather
18Lambert product log function is deﬁned as the following: for an exponential function xex, the inverse function
is such as it satisﬁes the condition x = f−1(xex) = W (xex), where W (x) is called the Lambert product log
function. It is applied for a general power function f(x) = xax, a ∈ R as x = W (f(x)·ln(a))
ln(a)
.
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small  see Eq. 16. In this case, small marginal changes in τi produce large marginal impacts on
the optimal transfer price p∗. On the other hand, a large proﬁt shifting incentive τ2− τ1 implies
that the initial price gap ∆p∗ is already wide, and further marginal changes in the tax rate τi
produce a weaker impact. Variation ∂p∗/∂τi becomes inelastic as the tax rate approaches the
boundary τi → 1, |τ2 − τ1| < 1.
Corollary 3. Unitary τi-elasticity of the optimal price gap ∆p
∗ occurs at the equality
γi(τi − |τ2 − τ1|) = |τ2 − τ1|
such that the arm's length tolerance parameter γi scales the impact of the diﬀerence τi− |τ2− τ1|
within Eq. 19.
Proof. Derives directly from Eq. 16:
ε∆p∗,τi =
∂∆p∗
∂τi
· τi
∆p∗
= γi · τi − |τ2 − τ1||τ2 − τ1| ;
ε∆p∗,τi = 1 → γi(τi − |τ2 − τ1|) = |τ2 − τ1|.
In overall, Eq. 19-20 show that the variation ∂p∗/∂τi converges if the general conditions
τi > 0, τi 6= τj are satisﬁed. The general convergence at individually increasing tax rates τi → 1,
τj 6=i → 1 are obtained as follows:
lim
τi→1
∂p∗
∂τi
=
γi(p
c − p¯c)(
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) ·
(
1 + 1γi
))γi · τj|1− τj |1−γi ;
lim
τj 6=i→1
∂p∗
∂τi
=
γi(p
c − p¯c)(
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) ·
(
1 + 1γi
))γi · 2τi − 1
τ1+γii · |τi − 1|1−γi
.
We also have limγi→0 ∂p∗/∂τi = 0. Nonetheless, in the limiting case of the tightest tax
assessment γi → 1, we obtain a special convergence for τi → τj equal to
lim
τi→τj
γi→1
∂p∗
∂τi
=
(pc − p¯c)
2τi(1− e−λi)(1 + zi) ,
from which we obtain
lim
τj 6=i→1
γi→1
(
lim
τi→1
∂p∗
∂τi
)
= lim
τi→1
γi→1
(
lim
τj 6=i→1
∂p∗
∂τi
)
= lim
τi→1
 lim
τi→τj
γi→1
∂p∗
∂τi
 = (pc − p¯c)
2(1− e−λi)(1 + zi) .
Otherwise, variation ∂p∗/∂τi diverges as follows:
lim
τi→τj
∂p∗
∂τi
= sgn(τ2 − τ1) · ∞, γi < 1;
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lim
τi→0
∂p∗
∂τi
= −sgn(τ2 − τ1) · ∞, τj 6=i > 0.
With respect to the other country-level variables related with the audit intensity λi > 0, tax
penalty zi > 0 and the arm's length tolerance parameter γi ∈ (0, 1], speciﬁcation of the optimal
price gap ∆p∗ in Eq. 16 shows an elaborate eﬀect. Variation of the optimal price gap ∆p∗ with
respect to each individual country-level variable is equal to:
∂p∗
∂λi
= ∆p∗ · −γie
−λi
1− e−λi ; (21)
∂p∗
∂zi
= ∆p∗ · −γi
1 + zi
; (22)
∂p∗
∂γi
= ∆p∗ ·
ln
 |τ2 − τ1|
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
+ 1
1 + γi
 . (23)
First regarding Eq. 21-22, both clearly present a negative eﬀect on the optimal price gap ∆p∗
for the complete interval of interest p∗ ∈ [pc, p¯c], which is consistent with the intuitive premise,
e.g. a marginal increase in the audit intensity λi or in the penalty rate zi increases the expected
tax penalty E(Z˜i(·)), thus it shortens the optimal price gap ∆p∗; a decrease in λi or zi produces
the opposite eﬀect.
For the Eq. 23, on the other hand, the eﬀect is not necessarily negative on the full interval
[pc, p¯c], for all ∀γi ∈ (0, 1]. In the general case, the variation ∂p∗/∂γi represents a non-positive
eﬀect over the optimal transfer price p∗ iﬀ it satisﬁes the inequality
ln
 |τ2 − τ1|
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1γi
)
 ≤ − 1
1 + γi
< 0;
otherwise, the eﬀect follows the proﬁt shifting direction. This positive eﬀect is counter-intuitive
at ﬁrst, for we expect that changes in the arm's length tolerance parameter γi ∈ (0, 1] to produce
only eﬀects that are opposite to the shifting incentive. Nonetheless, notice that the speciﬁcation
of the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ c in terms of p produces a marginal adjustment eﬀect on the
gains from proﬁt shifting equal to 1/(1 + γi)  see Eq. 16. It means that the eﬀect of marginal
changes in the tolerance parameter γi must be negative and must outburst the marginal eﬀect
of 1/(1 + γi), in order to produce a negative eﬀect on p
∗. This last outcome19 is specially due to
the speciﬁcation of P˜ c in terms of p within Eq. 15.
4.2 Modelling a General Tax Enforcement Eﬀect
While Eq. 21-23 show how marginal changes in individual anti-shifting variables aﬀect the
optimal transfer price p∗, the inﬂuence of a general enforcing behaviour from the harmed Country
i may be reﬂected simultaneously in more than one variable. In special, it is safe to assume that
the audit intensity λi > 0 and the arm's length tolerance parameter γi ∈ (0, 1] are both related
19More speciﬁcally, marginal changes in the tolerance parameter γi produce a positive eﬀect on p
∗ iﬀ Eq. 16
implies the inequality |τ2 − τ1| > (1 − e−λi) · (1 + zi) · τi · (1 + 1/γi). In this case, the optimal transfer price p∗
is increasing at γi, although it implies beforehand that p
∗ is not a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ c  see
Corollary 1.
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with some common measure of tax enforcement applied by Country i.
Let γ˙i ∈ (0, 1] be a regularised tax enforcement measure for the Country i, such that the arm's
length tolerance parameter γi is a monotone order-preserving function γi = g(γ˙i) : (0, 1]→ (0, 1],
for a weak tax enforcement implies γ˙i → 0, while strong tax enforcement implies γ˙i → 1.
Moreover, assume that the tax audit intensity λi > 0 varies with respect to tax enforcement γ˙i,
thus the audit intensity becomes a non-homogeneous Poisson rate function with respect to the
tax enforcement, λi(γ˙i) : (0, 1]→ R++. Assume that λi(γ˙i) is continuous. Hence, if the number
of tax audits performed by Country i is q(γ˙i) ∈ N and the tax enforcement level γ˙i ∈ (0, 1]
implies q(γ˙i) ≥ 0, limγ˙i→0 q(γ˙i) = 0, then the probability of exact q(γ˙i) = k audits is
P(q(γ˙i) = k, λi(γ˙i)) =
(Λi(0, γ˙i))
k · e−Λi(0,γ˙i)
k!
with the non-homogeneous Poisson intensity parameter equal to
Λi(0, γ˙i) =
∫ γ˙i
→0+
λi(y) dy. (24)
Eq. 24 derives from the non-homogeneous Poisson condition
P[q(γ˙i + ∆γ˙i)− q(γ˙i) = 1, λi(γ˙i)] ≈ λi(γ˙i)∆γ˙i
which says that the incremental probability of one additional tax audit by Country i is ap-
proximate to a linear relation between the rate function λi(γ˙i) at γ˙i and the variation in tax
enforcement ∆γ˙i. The total probability of tax audit for the MNE derives directly from Eq. 10
and Eq. 24 and is equal to
P(q(γ˙i) > 0, λi(γ˙i)) = 1− P(q(γ˙i) = 0, λi(γ˙i)) = 1− e−Λi(0,γ˙i).
Speciﬁcation of the audit rate function λi(γ˙i) is not a straight task. In general, existing studies
suggest that higher tax enforcement implies in more frequent audits, although the increments
on the number of tax audits vary through the enforcement range γ˙i ∈ (0, 1] (Alm, 2012), so we
assume that the audit rate is clearly non-decreasing as the tax enforcement γ˙i increases.
To simplify the analysis, deﬁne a general function f(γ˙i) : (0, 1] → R++, f(γ˙i) is monotone
continuous for ∀γ˙i ∈ (0, 1), and it satisﬁes limγ˙i→0 f(γ˙i) = 0, limγ˙i→1 f(γ˙i) = 1. Under adequate
conditions20 regarding the audit rate function λi(γ˙i) and the tax enforcement γ˙i, we argue that
the the audit probability can be parametrised with respect to the variable γ˙i as
P(q(γ˙i) > 0, λi(γ˙i)) = f(γ˙i) (25)
so we are able to deﬁne the optimal transfer price in Eq. 16 in terms of the tax enforcement
variable γ˙i ∈ (0, 1], equal to
p∗(γ˙i, ·) = p¯c +
 |τ2 − τ1|
f(γ˙i) · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1g(γ˙i)
)
g(γ˙i) (pc − p¯c).
20Derivation of the conditions for Eq. 25 in Appendix.
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From now on, simplify the notation of both general functions as g(γ˙i) = gγ˙i and f(γ˙i) = fγ˙i .
On the bounded domain γ˙i ∈ (0, 1], both functions gγ˙i , fγ˙i have the same limiting values on the
boundaries, γ˙i → 0 and γ˙i → 1, which are equal to
lim
γ˙i→0
gγ˙i = lim
γ˙i→0
fγ˙i = 0;
lim
γ˙i→1
gγ˙i = lim
γ˙i→1
fγ˙i = 1
by deﬁnition, regardless of their slopes. Since functions fγ˙i , gγ˙i are continuous on the complete
domain, ∀γ˙i ∈ (0, 1], we observe that any monotonic map F (f(·)) : (0, 1] → (0, 1] implies
|F (fγ˙i)− F (gγ˙i)| <∞. Therefore, it implies the following:
Proposition 5. For the optimal transfer price p∗(γ˙i, ·) parametrised with respect to the tax
enforcement variable γ˙i ∈ (0, 1], the maximising prices at the boundaries of the domain, γ˙i → 0
and γ˙i → 1 are equal to
lim
γ˙i→0
p∗(γ˙i, ·) = pc;
lim
γ˙i→1
p∗(γ˙i, ·) = p¯c + |τ2 − τ1|
2(1 + zi)τi
· (pc − p¯c).
Proof. For any marginal change in the tax enforcement γ˙i, variation in p
∗(γ˙i, ·) depends on the
eﬀect of both gγ˙i , fγ˙i , which is equal to [gγ˙i/(fγ˙i(1 + gγ˙i))]
gγ˙i . For the upper bound γ˙i → 1, we
clearly have
lim
γ˙i→1
(
gγ˙i
fγ˙i(1 + gγ˙i)
)gγ˙i
=
1
2
→ lim
γ˙i→1
p∗(γ˙i, ·) = p¯c + |τ2 − τ1|
2(1 + zi)τi
· (pc − p¯c).
For the lower bound γ˙i → 0, we derive the following:
ln
(
lim
γ˙i→0
(
gγ˙i
fγ˙i(1 + gγ˙i)
)gγ˙i)
= lim
γ˙i→0
ln
(
gγ˙i
fγ˙i(1 + gγ˙i)
)gγ˙i
= lim
γ˙i→0
gγ˙i · ln
(
gγ˙i
fγ˙i
)
= lim
γ˙i→0
gγ˙i · (ln gγ˙i − ln fγ˙i) ;
therefore, | ln gγ˙i − ln fγ˙i | <∞ → lim
γ˙i→0
gγ˙i · (ln gγ˙i − ln fγ˙i) = 0
→ lim
γ˙i→0
(
gγ˙i
fγ˙i(1 + gγ˙i)
)gγ˙i
= 1.
Since we also have the condition limγ˙i→0
( |τ2−τ1|
(1+zi)τi
)g(γ˙i)
= 1 with respect to the other country-
level variables, we ﬁnally conclude that limγ˙i→0 p∗(γ˙i, ·) = p¯c + 1(pc − p¯c) = pc.
Proposition 5 conﬁrms that the maximising transfer prices at the boundaries of the tax
20
enforcement domain, γ˙i → 0 and γ˙i → 1 are both α-cuts of the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ c.
Nonetheless, for marginal changes within the domain interval γ˙i ∈ (0, 1], the eﬀect over the
optimal transfer price p∗(γ˙i, ·) depends on how functions gγ˙i , fγ˙i vary. Diﬀerentiating p∗(γ˙i, ·)
with respect to γ˙i, we obtain the following standard-form equations:
∂p∗(γ˙i, ·)
∂γ˙i
= ∆p∗ ·
dgγ˙i
dγ˙i
·
ln
 |τ2 − τ1|
fγ˙i · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1gγ˙i
)
+ 1
1 + gγ˙i
− dfγ˙i
dγ˙i
· gγ˙i
fγ˙i
 ; (26)
For Eq. 26, we observe again that the variation ∂p∗(γ˙i, ·)/∂γ˙i is not necessarily negative for
all ∀γ˙i ∈ (0, 1]  compare it with Eq. 23. A negative variation such that sgn(∂p∗(γ˙i, ·)/∂γ˙i) =
−sgn(∆p∗(γ˙i, ·)) requires the following necessary condition for the functions gγ˙i , fγ˙i :
Proposition 6. Variation in the optimal transfer price p∗(γ˙i, ·) with respect to marginal changes
in the tax enforcement γ˙i is opposite to the proﬁt shifting incentive τ2−τ1, such that sgn(∂p∗(γ˙i, ·)/∂γ˙i) =
−sgn(∆p∗(γ˙i, ·)), iﬀ the functions gγ˙i , fγ˙i satisfy the condition
∀γ˙i ∈ (0, 1] : fγ˙i ≥
gγ˙i
1 + gγ˙i
.
Proof. For simpliﬁcation, assume initially the equalities τj 6=i = 0, zi = 0. For the Eq. 26 to have
a negative eﬀect, such that sgn(∂p∗(γ˙i, ·)/∂γ˙i) = −sgn(∆p∗(γ˙i, ·)), it requires the necessary
condition
dgγ˙i
dγ˙i
·
ln
 1
fγ˙i ·
(
1 + 1gγ˙i
)
+ 1
1 + gγ˙i
− dfγ˙i
dγ˙i
· gγ˙i
fγ˙i
≤ 0
for the complete domain ∀γ˙i ∈ (0, 1]. Rearranging, we obtain the inequality
dfγ˙i
dgγ˙i
· gγ˙i
fγ˙i
≥ ln
(
gγ˙i
fγ˙i · (1 + gγ˙i)
)
+
1
1 + gγ˙i
.
At the critical point ∂p∗(γ˙i, ·)/∂γ˙i = 0, we clearly have
fγ˙i =
gγ˙i
1 + gγ˙i
.
Now, for any small perturbation δ 6= 0 on function fγ˙i such that we have δ 6= 0 : fγ˙i =
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gγ˙i/(1 + gγ˙i) + δ, the necessary condition is equal to
d
dgγ˙i
(
gγ˙i
1 + gγ˙i
+ δ
)
·
(
gγ˙i(1 + gγ˙i)
gγ˙i + δ(1 + gγ˙i)
)
≥ ln
(
gγ˙i
gγ˙i + δ(1 + gγ˙i)
)
+
1
1 + gγ˙i
1
1 + gγ˙i
· gγ˙i
gγ˙i + δ(1 + gγ˙i)
≥ ln
(
gγ˙i
gγ˙i + δ(1 + gγ˙i)
)
+
1
1 + gγ˙i
1
1 + gγ˙i
·
(
gγ˙i − (gγ˙i + δ(1 + gγ˙i))
gγ˙i + δ(1 + gγ˙i)
)
≥ ln
(
gγ˙i
gγ˙i + δ(1 + gγ˙i)
)
−δ
gγ˙i + δ(1 + gγ˙i)
≥ ln
(
gγ˙i
gγ˙i + δ(1 + gγ˙i)
)
.
The inequality is satisﬁed for any non-negative value δ ≥ 0. On the other hand, if the
perturbation is negative such that δ < 0 → fγ˙i < gγ˙i/(1 + gγ˙i), we arrive at a contradiction 
the right hand side of the inequality becomes the larger term. Hence, it implies{
δ ≥ 0 : fγ˙i =
gγ˙i
1 + gγ˙i
+ δ
}
→ fγ˙i ≥
gγ˙i
1 + gγ˙i
.
At last, this necessary condition is clearly maintained if we drop the simpliﬁcations τj 6=i = 0,
zi = 0; for both LTP and HTP cases, τ1 6= τ2, τj 6=i > 0, zi > 0, we have the inequality
−δ
gγ˙i + δ(1 + gγ˙i)
≥ ln
(
gγ˙i
gγ˙i + δ(1 + gγ˙i)
)
> ln
(
gγ˙i
gγ˙i + δ(1 + gγ˙i)
)
+ ln
( |τ2 − τ1|
(1 + zi) · τi
)
which also implies fγ˙i ≥ gγ˙i/(1 + gγ˙i).
Proposition 5 shows that the optimal transfer price at the lowest enforcement level, γ˙i → 0
is equal to the least tolerable arm's length price pc, e.g. for the lowest tax enforcement, the
MNE may choose the transfer price equal to pc ∈ P˜ c, which is the farthest from the mode
p¯c. Moreover, Proposition 6 presents the necessary condition for the variation ∂p∗(γ˙i, ·)/∂γ˙i to
produce an eﬀect opposite to the proﬁt shifting incentive, τ2 − τ1 through the complete domain
γ˙i ∈ (0, 1]. Hence, it implies the following:
Corollary 4. Proposition 2 and Proposition 6 are equivalent.
Proof. Derives directly from Eq. 24 and Proposition 2, with the simpliﬁcations τj 6=i = 0, zi = 0,
for we have
Λi(0, γ˙i) = − ln(1− f(γ˙i)) ≥ − ln
1− 1(
1 + 1g(γ˙i)
)

1− f(γ˙i) ≤ 1
1 + g(γ˙i)
f(γ˙i) ≥ g(γ˙i)
1 + g(γ˙i)
.
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From Corollary 4, it means that the inequality fγ˙i ≥ gγ˙i/(1+gγ˙i) is also a necessary condition
for the optimal transfer price p∗(γ˙i, ·) to be a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ c. Otherwise,
we may have a tax enforcement level such that ∃γ˙i ∈ (0, 1] : p∗(γ˙i, ·) /∈ P˜ c.
Now, we derive a suﬃcient condition for the optimal transfer price p∗(γ˙i, ·) to be a α-cut of
the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ c for the complete domain ∀γ˙i ∈ (0, 1].
Proposition 7. If the functions gγ˙i , fγ˙i satisfy the condition fγ˙i ≥ gγ˙i for the complete domain
∀γ˙i ∈ (0, 1], the optimal transfer price p∗(γ˙i, ·) is a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ c.
Proof. Corollary 4 derives the necessary condition fγ˙i ≥ gγ˙i/(1 + gγ˙i) for the optimal transfer
price p∗(γ˙i, ·) to be a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ c with respect to the complete
domain ∀γ˙i ∈ (0, 1]. First, we are sure that the necessary condition attains the equality at the
lower bound of the domain, γ˙i → 0, for we have
lim
γ˙i→0
(
fγ˙i ≥
gγ˙i
1 + gγ˙i
)
= lim
γ˙i→0
fγ˙i ≥ lim
γ˙i→0
(
gγ˙i
1 + gγ˙i
)
= lim
γ˙i→0
fγ˙i = lim
γ˙i→0
(
gγ˙i
1 + gγ˙i
)
= 0.
But we also have that limγ˙i→0 gγ˙i/(1 + gγ˙i) = limγ˙i→0 gγ˙i = 0, so all terms converge to zero
at the very initial point γ˙i → 0:
lim
γ˙i→0
gγ˙i = lim
γ˙i→0
fγ˙i = lim
γ˙i→0
(
gγ˙i
1 + gγ˙i
)
= 0.
However, as the tax enforcement increases, γ˙i ∈ (0, 1] : γ˙i > 0, this equality is not maintained,
since it implies γ˙i > 0→ gγ˙i > gγ˙i/(1 + gγ˙i). Besides, as the tax enforcement reaches the upper
bound of the domain, γ˙i → 1, we have limγ˙i→1 gγ˙i = limγ˙i→1 fγ˙i = 1, thus it implies limγ˙i→1 fγ˙i >
limγ˙i→1(gγ˙i/(1 + gγ˙i)). Combining these two cases, we derive two possible inequalities:
{γ˙i ∈ (0, 1] : γ˙i > 0} →

gγ˙i ≥ fγ˙i ≥
gγ˙i
1 + gγ˙i
;
fγ˙i ≥ gγ˙i >
gγ˙i
1 + gγ˙i
.
It shows that if we have gγ˙i ≥ fγ˙i , we still need to conﬁrm that the necessary condition
fγ˙i ≥ gγ˙i/(1 + gγ˙i) is satisﬁed. On the other hand, if we have fγ˙i ≥ gγ˙i , the necessary condition
in Corollary 4 is automatically satisﬁed. Therefore, the condition ∀γ˙i ∈ (0, 1] : fγ˙i ≥ gγ˙i is a
suﬃcient condition for the optimal transfer price p∗(γ˙i, ·) is a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length
price P˜ c.
Remark that functions gγ˙i , fγ˙i refer to the arm's length tolerance parameter and the prob-
ability of tax audit respectively. Proposition 7 thus indicates that the optimal transfer price
p∗(γ˙i, ·) is certainly a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length price P˜ c if the audit probability is greater
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than the arm's length tolerance parameter, for the complete domain ∀γ˙i ∈ (0, 1]. Otherwise, we
still need to conﬁrm that the necessary condition fγ˙i ≥ gγ˙i/(1 + gγ˙i) is satisﬁed.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presents a model for optimal tax-induced transfer pricing under fuzzy arm's length
parameter. The fuzzy arm's length price follows the structure of a fuzzy number (Zadeh et al.,
1965) by means of a concave shape function with smooth membership grading, which varies with
respect to the arm's length tolerance parameter of tax authorities. Under usual conditions, the
optimal transfer price becomes a maximising α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length price, while it still
satisﬁes the conventional assumptions of convex concealment costs and increasing proﬁt-shifting
incentives at an increasing tax diﬀerentials.
At ﬁrst, we show that the MNE always obtains a gain from proﬁt shifting up to the optimal
transfer price, regardless of the shifting direction, and this gain is obtained at any levels of tax
penalty, audit probability and arm's length tolerance. Gains from proﬁt shifting are intensiﬁed
by adjusting the intra-ﬁrm outputs at a second maximisation stage. Moreover, the MNE may
obtain exceeding gains by extrapolating the fuzzy arm's length parameter if the probability of
tax audits is suﬃciently low. This extreme case is prevented specially by increasing the audit
intensity or intensifying the other anti-shifting mechanisms on the harmed country.
These analyses oﬀer some interesting insights on how the ambiguity of the arm's length pa-
rameter may aﬀect the proﬁt shifting strategy of ﬁrms. First and foremost, the fuzziness of the
arm's length parameter can be used by ﬁrms to achieve their proﬁt shifting goals, since this fuzzi-
ness is the condition that implies the gains from proﬁt shifting. For any questioning by the tax
authority, the transfer price may be more or less sustained based on arguments about the condi-
tions of the comparable transactions. Moreover, even if the tax authority observes all intra-ﬁrm
transactions in a full-audit mode, the ambiguity of what can considered an appropriate transfer
price is not eliminated. It means that the uncertainty is not attributed only to the probability
of being audited, but also on the tolerance level of the tax auditor. And this uncertainty can be
beneﬁcial for ﬁrms focusing on a proﬁt shifting strategy. At last, anti-shifting rules impose the
arm's length criterion for the transfer prices, but no requirements are currently imposed for the
level of internal outputs. In this sense, any change in the arm's length tolerance of tax authorities
might be oﬀset by adjustments in internal outputs if the MNE has some operational ﬂexibility,
so the ﬁnal amount of shifted proﬁts remains the same.
Appendix
Derivation of Eq. 9
For a variable g ∈ R++ as any point within a continuum of occurrences at a constant average
rate λ, the time y of the g-th occurrence is a random variable that follows a gamma distribution
and has a cumulative probability as P(y) = 1− Γ(g, λ)/Γ(g). The gamma function is deﬁned as
Γ(g) =
∫ ∞
0
λgyg−1e−λy dy
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and the upper gamma function is deﬁned as
Γ(g, λ) =
∫ ∞
λ
λgyg−1e−λy dy.
Since we have discrete events as g = k : k ∈ N, the upper gamma function can be expressed
as the series expansion
Γ(k, λ) = (k − 1)! · e−λy
k−1∑
q=0
(λy)q
q!
.
The second multiplier at the right hand side of the above equation represents the cumulative
chance of k − 1 events to occur at intensity λ up to moment y, where k is a Poisson random
variable21. In addition, the gamma function satisfy the property Γ(k) = (k − 1)! for discrete
variables k ∈ N, which implies the equality kΓ(k) = Γ(k + 1). Hence, assuming the occurrence
rate λ is obtained for a period up to y, thus y = 1, these conditions allow us to derive the
cumulative probability distribution of k events as
k∑
q=0
P(q) =
k!
k!
·
k∑
q=0
λqe−λ
q!
=
Γ(k + 1, λ)
Γ(k + 1)
which is presented in Equation 9. Poisson cumulative distribution function
∑k
q=0 P(q) expressed
by means of gamma function Γ(k, λ) is deﬁned for all positive real numbers and provides conti-
nuity condition for the analysis.
Derivation of Eq. 19-20
For all real numbers ∀x ∈ R, x is equal to x = sgn(x) · |x|, with | · | : R → R+ as the absolute
value function and sgn(x) as the sign function satisfying
sgn(x) =

−1, iﬀ x < 0
0, iﬀ x = 0
1, iﬀ x > 0.
For ∀x 6= 0, we have sgn(x) = x/|x| = |x|/x → |x| = x · sgn(x) = x/sgn(x), which implies
∂|x|/∂x = sgn(x). Diﬀerentiating |τ2 − τ1| with respect to τi for both LTP and HTP cases
provides
∂|τ2 − τ1|
∂τi
=

LTP → {τ2 < τ1, i = 1} → ∂|τ2−τ1|∂τ1 = sgn(τ2 − τ1) ·
∂(τ2−τ1)
∂τ1
= 1;
HTP → {τ2 > τ1, i = 2} → ∂|τ2−τ1|∂τ2 = sgn(τ2 − τ1) ·
∂(τ2−τ1)
∂τ2
= 1.
Under these properties, diﬀerentiating Eq. 16 with respect to τi provides the following stan-
dard form:
21The relation P(y) = 1 − P(k − 1) indicates that changes in occurrence rate λ produce an inverse impact on
the distribution; a random gamma-distributed variable y has mean E(y) = k/λ and variance V(y) = k/λ2.
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∂p∗
∂τi
=
∂p¯c
∂τi
+
∂∆p∗
∂τi
= 0 + γi
 |τ2 − τ1|
(1− e−λi)(1 + zi)
(
1 + 1γi
)
· τi
γi−1 · ∂
∂τi
 |τ2 − τ1|
(1− e−λi)(1 + zi)
(
1 + 1γi
)
· τi
 (pc − p¯c)
= γi · |τ2 − τ1|
γi−1(
(1− e−λi)(1 + zi)
(
1 + 1γi
)
· τi
)γ1+1 · [τi · (1− e−λi)(1 + zi)(1 + 1γi)
−|τ2 − τ1| · (1− e−λi)(1 + zi)
(
1 + 1γi
)]
(pc − p¯c)
=
γi(p
c − p¯c)
τγi+1i · |τ2 − τ1|1−γi
·
(1− e−λi)(1 + zi)
(
1 + 1γi
)
(
(1− e−λi)(1 + zi)
(
1 + 1γi
))γi+1 · (τi − |τ2 − τ1|)
=
γi(p
c − p¯c)(
(1− e−λi) · (1 + zi) ·
(
1 + 1γi
))γi · τi − |τ2 − τ1|
τ1+γii · |τ2 − τ1|1−γi
.
For ∂2p∗/∂τ2i , simplify the constant multiplier Ξ
c
i =
γi(p
c−p¯c)(
(1−e−λi )·(1+zi)·
(
1+ 1
γi
))γi at the right
hand side of Eq. 19. Standard form in Eq. 20 is derived as follows:
∂2p∗
∂τ2i
=
γi(p
c − p¯c)(
(1− eλi) · (1 + zi) ·
(
1 + 1γi
))γi · ddτi
(
τi − |τ2 − τ1|
τ1+γii · |τ2 − τ1|1−γi
)
= Ξci ·
(
0− (τi − |τ2 − τ1|) · [d(τ
1+γi
i · |τ2 − τ1|1−γi)/dτi]
(τ1+γii · |τ2 − τ1|1−γi)2
)
= Ξci ·
[(
− τi − |τ2 − τ1|
τ1+γii · |τ2 − τ1|1−γi
)
·
[(
(1 + γi)τ
γi
i · |τ2 − τ1|1−γi
τ1+γii · |τ2 − τ1|1−γi
)
+
(
(1− γi) · |τ2 − τ1|−γi · τ1+γii
τ1+γii · |τ2 − τ1|1−γi
)]]
= Ξci ·
[
−
(
τi − |τ2 − τ1|
τ1+γii · |τ2 − τ1|1−γi
)
·
(
1 + γi
τi
+
1− γi
|τ2 − τ1|
)]
= Ξci ·
(
τi − |τ2 − τ1|
τ1+γii · |τ2 − τ1|1−γi
)
·
(
(γi − 1) · τi − (γi + 1) · |τ2 − τ1|
τi · |τ2 − τ1|
)
=
∂p∗
∂τi
· (γi − 1) · τi − (γi + 1) · |τ2 − τ1|
τi · |τ2 − τ1|
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From the τi-semi-elasticity of the optimal price gap ∆p
∗ equal to ε∆p∗,τi/τi = γi · τi−|τ2−τ1|τi·|τ2−τ1| ,
the second-order τi-semi-elasticity of p
∗ is deﬁned as
ε2p∗,τi
τi
=
∂2p∗/∂τ2i
∂p∗/∂τi
=
ε∆p∗,τi
τi
− τi − |τ2 − τ1|
τi · |τ2 − τ1|
=
(γi − 1) · τi − (γi + 1) · |τ2 − τ1|
τi · |τ2 − τ1|
which is the multiplier at the right hand side of Eq. 20.
Derivation of Eq. 25
The homogeneous audit intensity λi > 0 can be any positive real number, thus the range of the
corresponding non-homogeneous audit rate function λi(γ˙i) : (0, 1] → R++ is unbounded above.
Since we have a bounded domain γ˙i ∈ (0, 1], therefore the rate function λi(γ˙i) must indeed be
unbounded above22, i.e. under the deﬁnition of non-uniformly continuous functions, it implies
{∀δ > 0, γ˙i ∈ (0, 1] : |∆γ˙i| < δ} → lim
γ˙i→1
|λi(γ˙i + ∆γ˙i)− λi(γ˙i)| =∞.
From the general function f(γ˙i) : (0, 1] → R++ as deﬁned in Section 4.2, let the audit rate
function follow a negative semi-elasticity design23, such that λi(γ˙i) = −d(1−f(γ˙i))dγ˙i · 11−f(γ˙i) is
unbounded above at the zeros, f(γ˙i)→ 1. Hence, it implies the following diﬀerential form:
lim
γ˙i→1
|λi(γ˙i + ∆γ˙i)− λi(γ˙i)| =∞ → λi(γ˙i) = −d(1− f(γ˙i))
dγ˙i
· 1
1− f(γ˙i) ;
λi(γ˙i)dγ˙i =
df(γ˙i)
1− f(γ˙i) .
Integrating on the full domain γ˙i ∈ (0, 1], we obtain a parametric representation of the audit
intensity Λi(0, γ˙i) in terms of f(γ˙i) equal to
22Of course, the condition for the function λi(γ˙i) to be unbounded above necessarily arises from our restriction
of the domain of γ˙i to the bounded interval (0, 1].
23For a diﬀerentiable function f(y) : Y → R, y ∈ Y , Y is bounded, the negative semi-elasticity equal to
− df(y)
dy
· 1
f(y)
is unbounded above at the zeros f(y) → 0. Two classical examples are the functions −1/y and
tan(y), which are unbounded above on the bounded domains y ∈ [−1, 0] and y ∈ [0, pi/2] respectively. Both
examples are deﬁned as the negative semi-elasticities of the functions f(y) = −y and f(y) = cos(y) as follows:
f(y) = −y : −d(−y)
dy
· 1−y = −
1
y
;
f(y) = cos(y) : −d cos(y)
dy
· 1
cos(y)
= tan(y).
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γ˙i ∈ (0, 1] : Λi(0, γ˙i) =
∫ 1
→0+
λi(y) dy =
∫ 1
→0+
df(y)/dy
1− f(y) dy
= − ln(1− f(γ˙i))
which satisﬁes the unboundedness condition. Therefore, the total probability of tax audit be-
comes P(q(γ˙i) > 0, λi(γ˙i)) = 1− e−Λi(0,γ˙i) = 1− eln(1−f(γ˙i)) = f(γ˙i).
Derivation of Eq. 26
To simplify the analysis, we adopt in this section the prime notation for the ﬁrst and second
derivatives as follows: for the diﬀerentiable function f(γ˙i) = fγ˙i , the ﬁrst and second derivatives
regarding the variable γ˙i are respectively equal to dfγ˙i/dγ˙i = f
′
γ˙i
, d2fγ˙i/dγ˙i
2 = f ′′γ˙i .
Diﬀerentiating the optimal transfer price p∗(γ˙i, ·) with respect to the variable γ˙i as parametri-
sation in Section 4.2, we obtain the following standard form:
∂p∗(γ˙i, ·)
∂γ˙i
=
∂p¯c
∂γ˙i
+
∂∆p∗
∂γ˙i
= 0 +
∂
∂γ˙i
 |τ2 − τ1|
fγ˙i · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1gγ˙i
)
gγ˙i (pc − p¯c)

= ∆p∗ ·
g′γ˙i · ln
 |τ2 − τ1|
fγ˙i · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1gγ˙i
)
+ gγ˙i · ∂∂γ˙i ln
 |τ2 − τ1|
fγ˙i · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1gγ˙i
)

= ∆p∗ ·
g′γ˙i · ln
 |τ2 − τ1|
fγ˙i · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1gγ˙i
)
+ fγ˙i(1 + gγ˙i) · g′γ˙ifγ˙i − gγ˙if ′γ˙i − g2γ˙if ′γ˙i(fγ˙i(1 + gγ˙i))2

= ∆p∗ ·
g′γ˙i ·
ln
 |τ2 − τ1|
fγ˙i · (1 + zi) · τi ·
(
1 + 1gγ˙i
)
+ 1
1 + gγ˙i
− f ′γ˙i · gγ˙ifγ˙i
 .
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